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2. the preference for reducing the kinds of entities 
appealed to in an explanation;Reply 
Robert P. Rosenfeld 
David Boonin-Vail has enlisted my support for Eliot 
Sober's position against the a priori use of parsimony 
considerations in assessing the plausibility of 
hypotheses. The position, with which I tentatively agree, 
is stated by Sober as follows: 
When a scientist uses the idea [of parsimony], 
it has meaning only because it is embedded in 
a very specific context of inquiry. Only 
because of a set of background assumptions 
does parsimony connect with plausibility in a 
particular research problem. What makes 
parsimony reasonable in one context therefore 
may have nothing in common with why it 
matters in another. The philosopher's mistake 
is to think that there is a single global principle 
that spans diverse scientific matters.1 
I believe that it is compatible with this to say that 
there are several kinds of parsimony, and that there 
may be serious doubts about which kind will properly 
apply in any given case, or even about what counts as 
parsimony. One might also wish to make distinctions 
between parsimony, simplicity, modesty, and related 
notions. However, for the purposes of this response I 
hope that such distinctions will not be crucial, and for 
the sake of brevity I will lump them together under 
the term 'parsimony' (although I believe that 
'simplicity' is the most inclusive of the terms). Also, 
for the sake of brevity, I will avoid giving a taxonomy 
of parsimony and will instead pick out four types that 
are of interest here: 
1. the appeal to "lower" ontological levels (or perhaps 
lower levels of organi:l.ation); 
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3. the appeal to the simplicity of the models used to 
explain the phenomena in question (simpler 
models being preferable); and 
4. the preference for single unifying explanations 
over multiple separate ones, even in cases where 
the multiple ones, considered separately, are more 
simple in form than the unifying one. 
Harrison and G. C. Williams both make appeals to 
type-1 parsimony, that based on ontological levels. It is 
not obvious why this would be a form of parsimony at 
all, since ontological levels seem to have no immediate 
conceptual connection to parsimony. There may be 
logical connections to be made, butthese must be argued 
for, and I would guess that such argument would in 
fact link level-parsimony to a parsimony of a more 
fundamental sort I believe that Harrison, for example, 
roots his case primarily in a type-2 parsimony, i.e. by 
arguing that since we do not need extra entities such as 
pain states, we should not infer them. In tbe cases under 
discussion, Boonin-Vail indicates that level-parsimony 
is also parasitic on a type-3 parsimony: lower-level 
explanations are more parsimonious because they are 
simpler in form than higher-level ones. When applied 
to the matter of pain, this leads to the response that 
Boonin-Vail has ghost-authored for Harrison: 
Explanations appealing to pain states, because they 
appeal to higher-order phenomena, are more complex 
than explanations that appeal to bard-wiring, which is 
a lower-level phenomenon. Since pain states are more 
complex, explanations appealing to them are less 
parsimonious and should therefore be abandoned in 
favor of hard-wiring explanations. 2 
I will answer this argument as I might ghost-author 
a response for Donald Griffin, using a variation of 
type-3 parsimony or perhaps a type-4 parsimony (i.e. 
one appealing to unifying explanations, as follows: 
It may be true that for any particular instance of 
behavior, considered separately, a hard-wired response 
mechanism is simpler than one appealing to some 
conscious state, painful or otherwise. However, in order 
to explain tbe entire ensemble of an organism's 
responses to its environment, a corresponding ensemble 
of hard-wired mechanisms may be unreasonably 
cumbersome. This, of course, would depend on the 
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organism. I suspect that a jellyfish or a clam, which 
would have a limited amount and variety of sensory 
information to integrate, and an anatomically limited 
set of responses available, would be quite parsi­
moniously hard-wired. However, most vertebrates, and 
some invertebrates, such as cephalopods and some 
arthropods, have a much greater amount and variety of 
sensory information, and a much greater anatomical 
range ofresponses, available. Although it is not known 
what threshold level of complexity is required to 
produce conscious states, it would be unjustified to 
conclude, without independent evidence, that it is 
greater than the total complexity involved in bard-wiring 
a typical vertebrate behavioral repertoire. If I were to 
give a quick aprioristic answer to the objection, I would 
say that it committed the fallacy of composition. 
As Boonin-Vail says, however, Harrison might be 
stubbornly aprioristic in response. But even ifHarrison 
is as aprioristic as Boonin-Vail claims, and is willing 
to ignore empirical evidence, he would still face the 
problem of defending his choice of one a priori 
application of a particular type of parsimony over 
another possible application that leads to an opposing 
conclusion. He could not responsibly "hide behind" 
another parsimony claim. IfSober and Boonin-Vail are 
correct (and I believe that they are), a defense of his 
choice would force him to pay attention to the concrete 
purposes and to the particular empirical circumstances 
of that application. 
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